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Rationality has traditionally been defined as choice behaviour which can be 
explained in terms of some implicit binary preference. The point of departure of this 
paper lies in permitting the binary preference relation to be “fuzzy.” Concepts from 
fuzzy set theory are used to formalise different notions of rationality, including 
degrees of rationality. The relation between these and traditional concepts is 
formally explored. In welfare economics, i?«as/-orderings have often been used to 
capture the inherent imprecisions of human value judgements. It is argued here that, 
in many situations, a more appropriate tool for this may be fuzzy orderings. 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 022, 024.
1. Introduction
That human preferences are typically characterised by different degrees of 
indeterminacy has been emphasised often enough. Attempts to incorporate 
such indeterminacy into our analyses have, however, been much more 
limited. It has also been argued persuasively that our rankings of societies in 
terms of social characteristics (e.g., equality, real national income, etc.) ought 
to reflect the inherent imprecisions of human perception instead of providing 
artificial “exact” rankings (Sen [14]). While I do comment on this 
(Section 5), the present paper is basically concerned not with evaluation but 
with individual rationality, in particular the theory of revealed preference. 
Here, as well as in normative analysis, the standard attempt to capture 
imprecision has been in terms of quasi-orderings (reflexive and transitive 
binary relations which may not be complete). While this does go some 
distance, a quasi-ordering has the difficulty that over each pair of alter-
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natives it does not permit degrees of imprecision.1 A natural way of 
permitting this is by using the idea of “fuzzy” binary relation. And 
fortunately for this we do not have to begin from scratch. Recent advances in 
the theory of fuzzy sets have meant a ready stock of tools and concepts.
In standard theory, a set is a well-defined collection in the sense that each 
element of the universal set is either a full member of it (gets a mark of 1) or 
not a member (gets 0). A fuzzy set is a collection which allows partial 
membership (i.e., an element could get a mark anywhere between 0 and 1). 
Now, if we think of a binary relation as a subset of a Cartesian product, then 
a fuzzy binary relation is a fuzzy subset of the Cartesian product.
While fuzzy preference relations could be used in many diverse areas of 
economics, the present focus is on revealed preference analysis—the kind 
developed by Samuelson [11], Arrow [1], Richter [9], Sen [13], 
Suzumura [15] and others. An individual is characterised by a choice 
function (i.e., a specification of chosen elements for every feasible set of 
alternatives). One line of approach pursued by Richter, Sen and Suzumura is 
to check whether the individual’s choice function could be thought of as the 
outcome of some preference maximisation. This implicit preference in this 
theory is required to be “exact.” In reality, however, human preferences are 
often marked by a certain amount of fuzziness and though their actual 
choices are perforce “exact,” they are nevertheless the outcome of fuzzy 
preferences. Consequently, this paper allows for the possibility that the 
choice function may be rationalizable by a fuzzy  preference relation. The 
idea of “exact” or unfuzzy choices based on fuzzy preferences is formalised 
using two standard concepts from the theory of fuzzy sets.
A fuzzy revealed preference theory has the advantage that it allows us to 
think in terms of human beings as possessed of different degrees of 
rationality instead of the harsher notion of a partition of rational and 
irrational persons.
The principle aim of this paper is to initiate the use of fuzzy set theory in 
preference analysis. Hence, a large part of the present effort is directed 
towards developing useful concepts. And, in fact, even the theorems should 
not be viewed as theorems of “surprise” but rather as propositions which 
establish some of the important properties of these new concepts.
1 In utility theory, in comparing inter- and intra-personal welfares there is a natural way of 
capturing a certain kind of indeterminacy. If we think of an individual as characterised by a 
collection of utility functions and his preferences as those which are in accord with each 
function in this collection, then an increasing amount of indeterminacy could be incorporated 
by making the collection increasingly broad [1 2 ,6 ,4 ]. Another approach, which has been 
used for revealed preference analysis, is to suppose that an individual’s choice is determined 
by a preference ordering which is stochastically chosen from a collection of possible orderings
2. Concepts in the Theory of Fuzzy Sets
Eubulides was a fourth century B. C. Greek philosopher who had devoted 
a substantial fraction of his life to discovering paradoxes. One of the most 
important paradoxes he discovered, which has many variants, is the Heap 
paradox. In essence it says: If from a heap of grain a person keeps removing 
one grain at a time, it will no doubt, after a while, cease to be a heap. Most 
of us would agree that there does not exist an integer n such that a collection 
of n grains would be described as a heap while a collection of n — 1 grains 
would be described as a non-heap. How does one reconcile these two 
statements? This paradox has many ramifications which we cannot go into 
here, but one thing is clear—the paradox arises because we think of a heap 
as an “exact” concept, i.e., each collection of grains must be either a heap or 
a non-heap. One way out is to think of each collection of being a heap of a 
certain degree between 0 and 1, with 0 signifying a complete non-heap and 1 
a complete heap with the numbers strictly between these extremes denoting 
the extent to which a collection is a heap. Not only would this help us out of 
Eubulides’ paradox but this is probably closer to our conception of a heap 
than the 0 — 1 concept which standard set theory commits us to. Given that 
a large number of definitions (e.g., the set of all bright red objects) are 
characterised by hazy boundaries, the motivation for a theory of fuzzy sets is 
obvious.
Let U be the universal (unfuzzy) set. A is a fuzzy subset of £/, or simply a 
fuzzy set, implies A : {/-► [0, 1 ]. For all x E U ,  A(x) is interpreted 
as the extent to which x  belongs to A. If a fuzzy set A is such that 
A(U) c= {0, 1} then A is described as an ordinary or an exact set.2 If A is an 
exact set, we may write x E A  for A{x) =  1 and x$LA for /4(x) =  0; and we 
may think of A as a collection, {y , z , . „ ,o f  exactly those elements x of U, 
for which x G A .  It is clear from this that a fuzzy set is a generalisation of 
our usual notion of a set since an exact set is just a special kind of a fuzzy 
set.
It is important to emphasise that given a fuzzy set A, A(x) is not the 
probability that x belongs to A. Nowadays many clubs take in partial 
members (e.g., affiliate members, half-members, etc.) which means that the 
set of members of a club maybe a fuzzy set. Clearly in that case to say that i 
is a half-member of a club is in a fundamental sense different from the 
assertion that there is a probability of |  that i is a member of the club.
In our analysis, we shall need some concept of distances between fuzzy 
sets. The following is a generalisation of Hamming distance between sets.
2 Some authors prefer to call it an unfuzzy set [8] or a hard set [5].
Given two fuzzy sets A and B in U (where # U  < oo), the generalised 
Hamming distance (Kaufman [7]), d(A,B), may be defined as
d(A,B)=  2  \A(x)-B(x) \ .
x e U
Let X  (# X  < oo) be a (exact) set of alternatives. R is a fuzzy binary 
relation (FBR) on X  means R ' . X x X -+ [0, I], i.e., R is a fuzzy subset of 
X x X .  As before, an exact binary relation on X  is a FBR, R , such that 
R(XXX)<= {0, 1}.
The FBR, R, on X  is said to be3
(a) reflexive iff Vjc E X, R(x, x) = 1;
(b) complete iff Vjc,y  E X , with x =£y, R(x,y) + R(y, x) ^  1;
(c) transitive iff Vx,j> E X, R(x ,y )  >  \R(jc, z ) +  \R(z,y),  
Vr E 2f\{x, .y} such that R(x, z) A 0, R(z,y)  ^  0;
(d) a fuzzy ordering if it is reflexive, complete and transitive.
Given a FBR, R, on X  and an exact non-empty set S  which is a subset of 
X , the greatest set in S  is denoted by G(S,R)  and is defined as 
G(S, R ): S' -+ [0, 1 ] such that Vx E S, G(S,R)(x) = minyf.s R(x,y), Note 
that G(S,R)  is a fuzzy set4 but if R is exact G(S, R) coincides with what 
Sen [12] calls the choice set and Suzumura [15] calls the greatest set.
3 My definition of transitivity is non-standard. By one definition (see [8, 7]) a FBR, R , on 
X , is transitive if V x ,y E .J , R(x,y)  ^  maxzeA. min|/?(x, z), /i(z ,y )} . This definition has one 
difficulty. Suppose X — {x,y7z} and R(x, z)  =  0.5, R(z,  y ) =  0.5. Then the lower bound on 
R(;t,y) is 0.5. Consider, alternatively, that R(x,  z) =  1, R (z ,y ) =  0.5. Even in this case the 
lower bound on R(;t, y) is 0.5. Clearly in the second example /?(x,y) may be expected to be 
above that in the first example. One general way of correcting this is to define transitivity in 
terms of the property R (x ,y ) >  a max{R(x, z), R(z,  y)} +  /? min )i?(x, z), R(z,y)j ,  
Vz £  A A jxy}, such that R(x, z)  0, R(z, y) =£ 0; and with a +  / ? = l , a ,  /? > 0. A simpler way 
(which is in fact a special case of this) is the definition I use. The important principle in 
defining fuzzy set theoretic concepts is that the concepts must coincide with the standard ones 
in the special case of the set being exact. It is easily checked that if R(X xX)<=  {0, 1), then 
my definitions of refiexivity, completeness, transitivity and ordering coincide with the 
traditional definitions (as, e.g., in Sen [12]).
4 It is natural that if R is fuzzy, the greatest set will be fuzzy as well. However, given our 
practice of thinking of the greatest set as an exact concept, we may be tempted to treat the 
points of S which score the highest with the function G(S,R)  as the truly greatest elements 
and the rest as not greatest. That such an approach is contrived is obvious if we adopt a dual 
perspective: that is, first try to locate the not-greatest elements and then treat the residual as 
greatest. To retain the same spirit as above, we should define the lowest scorers with the 
function G(S, R)  as the not-greatest elements. These two approaches would give contradictory 
results. Also, my definition has the advantage of having parallels to Orlovsky’s definition of 
“best” (see footnote 5).
Clearly, given a binary relation there are different ways of defining the 
“best” elements in a set. The above definition of a greatest set is one 
formalisation of the general idea of a set of “best” elements. There can 
indeed be others. The definition used in Orlovsky [8]3 *5 can be shown to be 
the fuzzy counterpart of the concept of a maximal set in traditional choice 
theory (see [12, 15]). It is possible to construct alternative approaches to 
revealed preference theory by using different definitions as illuminated by 
Suzumura [15] but here we restrict attention to the greatest set.
3. Choice Functions and Rationality
Let X  (3 ^  # X  < oo) be the basic (exact) set of alternatives. Let K  be the 
set of all exact subsets of X  containing two or more elements. An individual 
is characterised by a choice function, C(-), which is defined as
C : K - ^ K  and VS 6  K, C{S) c  S.
In this paper—as also in Arrow [1], Sen [13], Suzumura [15, 16] and 
others6—the choice function is a primitive. It is implicitly treated as an 
observable.7 Having observed an individual’s choice function, we want to 
decide whether it may be described as “rational” or not. There is a vast 
literature around essentially this problem. The attention here is on a 
particularly ingenious idea of Richter [9, 10] that a choice function is 
rational if it can be thought of as having been “generated” by a (exact) 
binary relation, i.e., if C(-) can be thought of as the outcome of preference 
maximisation. Thus C(-) is Richter rational iff there exists an exact binary 
relation R, on C such that for all S E K , 0(5) = G(S, R). In this case the R 
which rationalises C(-) need not satisfy any properties. A more demanding 
and probably a more satisfactory definition of rationality used by Richter 
[10] and widely discussed since, is regular rationality.
3 Given a FBR, R,  Orlovsky defines strict preference, P(R),  as follows: P(R)(x,y) =
max{i?(x,y) — R(y,  x), 0) and then he defines the set of “nondominated elements”, M(S,R)
as follows: M(S, R)(x) =  I — maxye5 P(R)(y,  x). If R is exact, clearly this definition coincides 
with the standard definition of a maximal set.
6 In Arrow and Sen, the choice function is defined on the entire domain K.  Suzumura’s 
framework is more general in that he allows for the possibility that the domain of the choice 
function may be a subset of K.  This difference is critical. Actually what is crucial in the 
Arrow-Sen framework is that the domain includes all those subsets o f X  which contain 2 or 3 
elements.
7 Though the problem is ignored here, it is important to note that observing a choice 
function has more than mere practical difficulties, as I have discussed elsewhere [3].
Regular Rationality
C(-) is regular rational iff 3 an exact binary ordering, R, on X  such that 
V S £ tf, C(S) = G(S,R).
Regular rationality is of particular interest because of its equivalence to 
other standard axioms of rationality, like Samuelson’s [11] weak axiom—as 
interpreted by Arrow [1].
The spirit of these definitions is that a person is rational if (i) he possesses . 
an exact binary relation (with or without some properties) and (ii) he 
adheres to it when choosing. In reality, most human preferences are inexact; 
and hence the objective of this paper is to allow for fuzziness in preference, 
i.e., to develop concepts of rationality without using (i). That is, a person 
will be described as rational if his choice function, C(-), could be thought of, 
in some sense, as the overt expression of an underlying fuzzy preference. 
This may be formalised in different ways depending on how we associate an 
exact set of best elements to a fuzzy  binary relation, I explore two routes 
here using two concepts from the existing work on fuzzy set theory.
Consider first Orlovsky’s [8] concept of “unfuzzy dominance” based on a 
FBR and its corresponding definition of rationality.
Unfuzzy Dominance
Given a FBR, R, on X The unfuzzy dominant set in S 6  K  is denoted by 
D(S,R)  and defined as D(S, R )=  {.*£ S\G(S, R)(x) = 1}.
D-Rationality
C(-) is D-rational iff 3 a fuzzy ordering, R, on X  such that V S£i£, 
C(S) = D(S, R).
D-rationality permits individuals to have fuzzy preferences and therefore 
has a motivation which is distinct from the numerous existing rationality 
concepts. But, unfortunately, it gives us no extra mileage because it turns out 
that .D-rationality is behaviourally indistinguishable from regular rationality.
T h e o r e m  1. An individual is D-rational iff he is regular rational.
Proof Let C(-) be regular rational. Hence 3 an exact ordering, R, on X  
such that VS & K , C(S) = G(S,R). Hence, V S E K ,  G(S, R) is exact which 
implies that V x E S ,  G(S,R)(x)E  {0, 1}. It follows from the definition of 
D{S,R)  that G{S,R)(x) = 0 ^ x £ D { S , R )  and G(S, R)(x) = 1 -»x 6  
D(S, R). Hence D(S, R) = G(S, R ). Therefore, VS £  K, C(S) = D(S, R), i.e., 
C(-) is D-rational.
Now consider a C(-) that is D-rational. Therefore, 3 a fuzzy ordering, say 
-R*, such that VS EK,  C(S) = D(S,R*).  Define an exact binary relation R 
as
Vx, jf£  X,R(x,y)  =
if 7? jp) =  1 
ifR*(x,y)  < 1.
Let S E K . x E  G(S, £ ) <-» Vy e S, R(x ,y) = 1 
<-► V y £ S , R * ( x , y )  = 1 
<-> G{S, R *){x) = 1 
<-+ x E D(S , R *).
Hence V S E K,  C(S) = D(S, R*) = G(S, R). The proof is completed by 
showing that R is an ordering. The reflexivity of R is an immediately conse­
quence of the reflexivity of R*. Since by the definition of a choice function 
C(S)=£0, V S E K,  it follows that Vx , y EX,  D({x,y\, R*) ^  0.  Hence 
/?*(*,>>) = 1 or R*(y,  jc) =  1, which implies R(x ,y)=  1 or R(y, x ) =  1, i.e., 
R is complete. Finally, to prove transitivity consider x, y, z £  X.
R(x ,y)= l ,R (y , z )  = l ^ R * ( x , y ) =  l , R * ( y , z ) =  1
R*(x, z) =  1, by transitivity of R *
-> R(x, z )=  1. |
Theorem 1 implies that whenever a person’s behaviour is such that it can 
be rationalised using a fuzzy  ordering, there must exist an exact ordering 
which rationalizes it in the sense of Richter’s regular rationality. This renders 
the use of a fuzzy  ordering inconsequential in practice. A more interesting 
approach is suggested by an alternative method of constructing a dominant 
exact set from a FBR. This makes use of the concept of the “nearest unfuzzy 
subset” (see Kaufman [7]) though my definition is slightly unconventional. 
In what ensues, the assumption of finiteness of X  is important. (Note that 
this rules out a direct application to traditional consumption sets.)
Nearest Exact Set
Given a fuzzy set A in X, a nearest exact set of A, denoted 7V[^ 4], is any 
exact set which is nearest to A in terms of the generalised Hamming distance 
(see Section 2). It follows that N[A ] is any set' with the property
{x e-X\A(x)  > 0.5} C= N[A ] c  {x £  X\A(x)  >  0.5}.
N-Rationality
C(-) is N-rational iff 3 a fuzzy ordering, R , on X  such that V S E K ,  
C(S) =  N[G(S, /?)]. A fuzzy ordering R which has this property is said to 
N-rationalise C(*).
Z)-rationality, we saw above, makes no extra allowances than regular 
rationality. Af-rationality goes to the other extreme.
Theorem 2. All individuals are N-rational.
Proof. Define a FBR, R> on X  as follows:
if x ^ y ,  
if x =  y.
Hence VS E K, G(S, R) has the property that V x E S ,  G(S, ,R)(jc) =  0.5. 
Hence, V exact set T c S ,  T = N[G(S,R)], i.e., T is a nearest exact set of 
G{S,R). Hence VC(-), VS EX , C(S) =  N[G(S, R)]. Clearly R is an 
ordering. Hence R, defined as above, can A-rationalise any choice 
function. |
At first sight this is a disappointing result. But on reflection it becomes 
clear that while A-rationality is indeed a vacuous concept, Theorem 2 is 
precisely what one expects from a fuzzy revealed preference theory. In fuzzy 
preference analysis we ask the question: Can a person’s choice behaviour be 
explained in terms of a fuzzy ordering? And Theorem 2 answers: Yes, as 
long as we are willing to allow fuzziness of any degree. As mentioned earlier, 
following Richter [9], in a large number of papers including the present one, 
the concept of raionality has two suppositions (i) a person has a preference 
ordering and (ii) he chooses in adherence to it. What Theorem 2 suggests is 
the following: If an individual has a (fuzzy or exact) preference ordering but 
he fails to adhere to it, then we could always conceive of another person who 
has a fuzzier preference ordering and adheres to it and whose behaviour is 
identical to that of the first.
If we consider regular rationality as a kind of “full” rationality then 
Theorem 2 suggests the possibility of thinking of individuals as possessing 
different degrees of rationality: If C(-) and C(-) are such that R and R are 
the “least’’-fuzzy orderings (respectively) which A-rationalise them and R is 
“less” fuzzy than R, then C(-) could be thought of as more rational than 
C(-), particularly since C(>) is, in some sense, closer to a regular rational 
choice function. It is this idea which is developed in the next section.
4. The Extent of Rationality
In traditional theory, one person can never be more rational than another 
without him being completely rational and the other being completely 
irrational. As discussed above, fuzzy revealed preference theory leads, quite 
naturally, up to the idea of the extent of rationality. To formalise this we 
need some measure of the “fuzziness” of binary relations. Since a FBR is a 
fuzzy subset of a Cartesian product, we may consider the following standard 
definition.
For any FBR, R, on X , its index of fuzziness, v(R), is defined as
v(R) =
2d(R,N(R)) 
# ( X X X )  ’
where N(R) is a nearest exact set of R , and d(R,N(R)) is the generalized 
Hamming distance (defined in Section 2) between R and N(R).8
It is easy to check that if R is a completely fuzzy binary relation 
(Vx,yeEX, R(x,^) =  0.5) then v(R)= 1 and if R is exact, v(R) = 0. In this 
paper our attention is on orderings rather than arbitrary binary relations. 
Note that a completely fuzzy ordering is defined as follows
if x i - y \  
if x = y.
Hence for a completely fuzzy ordering v(R) < 1, and the extent by which 
v(R) falls short of one clearly depends on #X.  Hence for fuzzy orderings it 
is more apt to define an index of fuzziness (naming it degree of fuzziness to 
distinguish it from the standard measure v(R)) as follows:




This measure has the advantage of taking values from 0 to 1, with the two 
ends signifying respectively complete fuzziness and exactitude.
Now we can formally define the extent of ones rationality based on the 
informal idea discussed at the end of Section 3.
For brevity, let ^?[C(-)] be the set of all fuzzy orderings which N- 
rationalise C(-).
Degree o f Fuzzy Rationality
C(-) is fuzzy rational o f degree i2[C( • )], which is defined as follows:
£[£(•)]= 1 - mm 3(R).
« e ^ [ C ( - ) ]
By Theorem 2 we know that ] is non-empty for all C(-). Hence
Q[C{ ■ )] is well-defined and every individual is fuzzy rational of some 
degree.
8 It is true that N(R)  is non-unique since one fuzzy set can have more than one nearest 
exact set. It is however easy to see that d(R, N(R))  is unique for all N(R).  Hence v(R) is well- 
defined.
What is interesting is that the concept of degrees of fuzzy rationality has 
links with concepts in the standard theory of revealed preference, in 
particular with Samuelson’s [11], weak axiom. Following Arrow [1], the 
weak axiom o f revealed preference (WARP) may be defined as below.
WARP. C(-) satisfies WARP iff there does not exist S l , S 2E K  such 
that for some and y E  C(S2), x E  S 2\C (S 2).
We shall say that WARP is violated at (x,y) iff 35”,, S 2 6  K such that 
jcECOS'i), y E S  j and x  E S 2\C (S2). If WARP is violated at
(a, b), for all a,bEX,a=£b,  we say that C(-) everywhere violates WARP. 
“C(-) nowhere violates WARP” is defined similarly. It is now clear that a 
person is rational in the sense of Samuelson, i.e., his choice function satisfies 
WARP, iff WARP is nowhere violated. A single violation is equated with 
irrationality.
The next theorem shows the connection between fuzzy rationality and the 
Arrovian version of Samuelson’s weak axiom.
Theorem 3. I f  C(-) satisfies WARP then /2[C(-)] =  1 and if  C(-) 
everywhere violates WARP then I2[C(-)] =  0. Further, /2[C(-)] = 1 implies 
C(-) satisfies WARP.
Proof First note that [C(-) is regular rational] <-> [/2[C(-)] = 1]. This is 
an immediate consequence of the fact that if R  is an exact ordering then 
d(R, N(R)) — 0. Now, given the known theorem (see [13]; see also [15]), 
that WARP is equivalent to regular rationality when the domain of the 
choice function, C(-), includes all subsets of X  containing 2 or 3 elements, it 
follows that [C(-) satisfies WARP] <-> [/2[C(-)] =  1].
What remains to prove is that if C(-) everywhere violates WARP, then 
i2[C(-)] =  0. Suppose C(-) everywhere violates WARP. Let R* be a solution 
of minA6J?[C(i)] S(R). Hence R*  A-rationalises C(-). Let a, y E X ,  x ^ y .  
Since C(-) everywhere violates WARP, HSj, iS2 6  K such that
a E C ^ ,) ,
y e  c(s2), X E S 2\C (S 2).
Since R * A-rationalises C(-), it follows that
x EN[G{Slf /?*)], y e s 19 
y E N[G(S2, R *)], X e S 2\N[G(S2, R*)}.
It follows from the definitions of a greatest set and a nearest exact set that 
R*(x, y) ^  0.5, /?*(y, a) >  0.5; and that 3z E S 2 such that /?*(*, ^ )<  0.5.
There are two possibilities: z = y  or z=£y. If z = y, then it immediately 
follows that 2?*(.x,y) =  0.5. If z=ty, then by the transitivity of
R*(x,z)>\R*{x,y) + \R*{y, z).
Since z € . S 2 and y 67V[G(.S2, /?*)], hence *(y, ^ 0.5. Since, also,
>0.5 and R*(x, z)< 0 .5 , for the above inequality to be valid it is 
necessary that R ^ (x , y )~  0.5. Given that (xyy) was arbitrarily chosen, it 
follows that V x, y E X ,  with x ^ y ,  R*(x,y) = 0.5. Since R* is an ordering 
and therefore reflexive, V x E l, R*(x, x )=  1. Hence,
d(R*9N{R*)) = X X ) ~  #X)
which implies <5(/?*)= i, i.e., f2[C(-)] = 0 . I
In the standard theory of revealed preference, irrationality is equated with 
a single act of irrationality. Thus a person is rational in the sense of 
Samuelson if and only if he nowhere violates WARP. This theory cannot 
distinguish between a person in whose choice behaviour there exists a case of 
irrationality to one who is consistently irrational. But as Theorem 3 shows in 
fuzzy revealed preference analysis a person who satisfies WARP everywhere 
and one who nowhere satisfies it occupy two ends of a range of possible 
degrees of irrationality.
It may be useful to show with an example a partially rational person.
Example 1. Let X =  {x9y, z) and C(-) be as follows:
C{X)= {x,y},C{{x,y})= {y}, C{{y, z}) = {y}, C({x, z}) = {*}.
Clearly the person chooses “oddly” over {x,y} but is quite “sane” in his 
choice over all other pairs. It is easy to check that he is irrational in terms of 
WARP and is therefore also not regular rational. Fuzzy revealed preference 
theory, however, distinguishes him from a totally irrational person. Note that 
R E ^[C («)] <r+R is a fuzzy ordering and
N[G{X,R)) =  {x,y}, 7V[G({.*,y}, tf] =  {y},
AT[G({y,z}),*] =  {y}, AT[G({*, =  {*}.
Hence R £  <-> Ris a fuzzy ordering and
2?(x,y)> 0.5, R(y, a) >0.5, z )> 0 .5 , jR(x,y)<0.5
R(y, z) 0^.5, R(z,x) ^  0.5, * (z ,y )<  0.5 ^
Now consider all fuzzy orderings on X which satisfy property (1). It is easy
to check that the least fuzzy ordering (in the sense of S(R)) in this class is an 
ordering R * defined as follows:
**(*,>0 =  0.5,
R *(j>, x) = R*(y ,z)  = R *(x, z) = R *(x, x) = R*(y,y)  = R*(z,z)  = 1, 
R*(z,y) — R *(z,x) -  0.
Hence d(R*,N(R*)) = \, S(R*)=!\  and /2[C(-)] =  Therefore C(-) is 
fuzzy rational of degree g. I
Note that while Theorem 3 provides a complete characterisation of 
rationality of degree 1, it provides only a partial characterisation of the other 
extreme of the rationality spectrum, namely fuzzy rationality of degree 0. 
This is because while it is true that everywhere violation of WARP does 
imply D[C(-)] = 0 , the reverse implication is not valid. This is reasonable: 
Suppose # X  =  3. Then it is easy to check that it is impossible to violate the 
weak axiom everywhere, i.e., over all ordered pairs (*,>>). If the reverse 
implication was valid, it would imply that in this case no choice function 
could be completely irrational (i.e., i2[C(-)] = 0), by definition. Fortunately, 
as the next example shows, that is not so.
E x a m p l e  2. Let X  =  {x,y, z) and C(-) be as follows:
C(X)={x\ ,  C({x,y})~x|, C({y , z ) )={y \ ,  C({*,z}) =  (z).
While this person’s choices appear thoroughly inconsistent, note that he does 
not everywhere violate WARP; in particular WARP is not violated over 
(x,^). Nevertheless, this person is fuzzy rational of degree 0.
Suppose R 6 ^ [C (-) ] . Then, by a process of reasoning similar to the one 
used in Example 1, we get
(i)/?(x, y) >0.5, (ii)R(x, z) > 0.5, (iii)R(^, z) > 0.5, (iv)/?(*,*) > 0.5, 
(v )R (^ ,x )< 0 .5 , (vi)/?(;?,>>)< 0.5, (vii) R(x, * )<  0.5.
By transitivity, (iii), (iv) and (v): /?(.y, z) = i?(z, x) = R(y,  x) — 0.5.
By transitivity, (i), (iv) and (vi): /?(*,>>) = /?(z,^) =  0.5 
By (ii) and (vii): R(x, z) =  .5,
Hence, Va, b £  X  with a =£ b, R(a, b) =  0.5. Since R is an ordering, Va 6  X , 
R(a,a)=  1. Hence <5(R) =  L Since R was arbitrarily chosen from ^[C (-)],
hence W?Gi?[C(-)],<5(*)=l. Hence fl[C(-)] =  0. |





▼ Fuzzy rationality of degree v 
0 ------------------------------------------- > l
F ig u r e  1
The results derived in this paper and also the earlier result that WARP is 
equivalent to regular rationality [15] are summed up with an implication 
diagram (Fig, 1). A one way arrow represents implication and a two way 
arrow equivalence. It may be worthwhile emphasizing that the results are 
based on the assumption that all 2 or 3 element subsets of the universal set 
of alternatives are members of the domain of the choice function, unlike in 
classical consumer theory in which the domain consists of a class of convex 
polyhedra.
5. Exact Quasi-Orderings and Fuzzy Orderings
The relevance of fuzzy preference analysis in positive economics stems 
from the fact that human preferences are often marked by different degrees 
of indeterminateness and a theory based on the assumption of exact 
preferences may lead not only to wrong answers but, more importantly, to 
wrong questions. Thus questions like “Is an agent rational?” or “Does he 
consider x  preferable to j>?” may be fundamentally misleading, and should 
instead be replaced by (respectively) “How rational is an agent?” or “To 
what extent does he consider a- preferable to y l ”
While thus far our concern was exclusively with positive issues, some of 
the fuzzy relational concepts used here could have important applications in 
normative economics. This is because concepts like inequality or social 
welfare may be inherently imprecise. Of course we are, in principle, free to 
define away the imprecision. But as Sen [14, p. 47-48] argues in the context 
of “inequality,” “In a trivial sense ••• one can define “inequality” precisely as 
one likes, and as long as one is explicit and consistent one may think that 
one is above criticism. But the force of the expression “inequality,” and 
indeed our interest in the concept, derive from the meaning that is associated
with the term, and we are not really free to define it purely arbitrarily. 
And—as it happens—the concept of inequality has different facets which 
may point in different directions...” From this persuasive axiom what Sen 
goes on to attack in conventional evaluative rankings is the property of 
completeness (see Sen [14, pp. 47-8, 72-6]). Thus he argues for the use of 
quasi-orderings for comparing inequality and real income in different 
economies. While within the confines of unfuzzy binary relations this is an 
obvious conclusion, it is not so in a broader framework. In the latter, it is 
not clear that an argument for the eschewal of orderings on the ground that 
most evaluative concepts have “different facets which may point in different 
directions,” is a case for the adoption of quasi-orderings rather than fuzzy 
orderings.
In particular quasi-orderings have one important difficulty which is in 
some sense similar to the very one which motivates its use in preference to 
orderings. With a quasi-ordering, for any pair of alternatives, {jc, jp}, the 
preference relation is either not defined at all or completely defined. There 
can be no indeterminacy there! This is precisely where the main advantage of 
fuzzy orderings lie. Not only in this area but even elsewhere, it is possible 
that the motivation which has prompted the use of quasi-orderings may well 
be captured with greater aptness by fuzzy relations or orderings.
This may be illustrated with a suggestion made by Sen [14, pp. 72-74] for 
inequality rankings which allow for the inherent multi-facetedness of the 
concept of equality:
Suppose here are k basic criteria, C 1,..., Ck, each representing one facet of 
the concept and each yielding a complete ordering. Then one way of ranking 
economies is in terms of the intersection, Q, of these k orderings,—the inter­
section being defined as follows:
Vx,y,xQy iffxC'y, Vi 6  {1,..., k\.
Q, it may be checked, is a quasi-ordering. Sen illustrates the use of this inter­
section method by actually computing the quasi-ordering of income 
distributions in five countries based on three criteria, the Gini coefficient, the 
coefficient of variation and the standard deviation of logarithms.
The difficulty with the intersection method lies in the fact that it errs on 
the side of caution. Suppose that all but one criterion judges x  superior to y 
and only one criterion considers y  to be superior. By the intersection method 
we can pass no judgement on x  and y. This is a particularly serious problem 
if k happens to be large. Moreover, this method has a kind of discontinuity: 
Beginning from a case of full consensus if one criterion changes its ranking 
between jc and y, the quasi-ordering Q switches from full judgement to no 
judgement at all between x  and y.
One way of overcoming this while retaining the spirit of Sen’s suggestion
is to define a FBR as an aggregation of the k criteria in the following sense: 
Given k basic (exact) orderings C1,..., C \  let the FBR, Q, be defined as 
follows:
k
Vx, y, Q(x, y) = a, C'(x, y), at = 1 and at > 0, V/'.
/ = i
For each i, a, measures the relative importance of the / th criterion. 
Remember that since C' is exact, C'(x,y) =  1 or 0. It can be checked that Q 
is reflexive and complete. This follows from the reflexivity and completeness 
of C‘, for all i. Q, however, does not satisfy transitivity (as defined above). 
This need not be too disturbing since over domains of alternatives where Q 
happens to be exact, transitivity is ensured, i.e., [Q(x,y) =  1, Q(y, z) = 1] -> 
Q(x, z )=  1. Hence Q does satisfy a kind of “weak” transitivity property 
which coincides with the standard definition of transitivity where the binary 
relation in question is exact.
Q has the advantage that, unlike Q, it does not go completely silent as 
soon as there is the smallest conflict of opinion. It thereby avoids the 
“discontinuity” problem which characterises Q : If in comparing x with y, a 
small subset of the collection of basic criteria differs from the rest, a small 
amount of fuzziness enters the overall ranking between x  and y.
In closing, it is important to point out that there is one aspect in which a 
fuzzy ordering is more restrictive than a quasi-ordering. Given a fuzzy 
ordering, R, R(x,y) + /?(y, x) > 1; for x, y. This means that a fuzziness over 
(y, x) must have a complementary unfuzziness over (x,y). Unlike a quasi­
ordering, a fuzzy ordering does not permit a two-way ignorance between x 
and y, i.e., we can never have R(x,y)  =  R(y, x) =  0. This may be an 
advantage or a disadvantage depending on the problem at hand.
In all these exercises of evaluative ranking, it is important however to 
appreciate that while there is much to criticise in attempts to artificially rank 
societies as orderings, the other extreme of complete fuzziness is barren. The 
art of constructing appealing measures of social characteristics, like 
inequality and real rational income, depends critically on how one strikes a 
balance.
R e f e r e n c e s
1. K. J. Arrow, Rational choice functions and orderings, Economica 26 (1959), 121-127.
2. S. Barbera and P. K. Pattanaik, Rationalizability of stochastic choices in terms of 
random orderings (mimeo), 1981.
3. K. Basu, “Revealed Preference of Government,” Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 
1980.
4. K. Basu , Determinateness of the utility function: Revisiting a controversy of the thirties, 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 49 (1982), 307-311.
5. J. C. Bezdek, B. Spillman, and R. Spillman, A fuzzy relation space for group decision 
theory, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 1 (1978), 255-258.
6. C. Blackorby, Degrees of cardinality and aggregate partial orderings, Econometrica 43 
(1975), 845-852.
7. A. Kaufman, “Theory of Fuzzy Subsets, I,” Academic Press, New York, 1975.
8. S. A. Orlovsky, Decision-making with a fuzzy preference relation, Fuzzy Sets and 
Systems 1 (1978), 155-167.
9. M. K. Richter, Revealed preference theory, Econometrica 34 (1966), 635-645.
10. M. K. Richter, Rational choice, in “Preferences, Utility and Demand” (J. S. Chipman et 
a i, Eds.), pp. 29-58, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1971.
11. P. A. Samuelson, A note on the pure theory of consumers’ behaviour, Economica N.S. 5 
(1938), 61-71, 353-354.
12. A. K. Sen, “Collective Choice and Social Welfare,” Oliver & Boyd, London, 1970.
13. A. K. Sen, Choice functions and revealed preference, Rev. Econ. Stud. 38 (1971), 
307-317.
14. A. K. Sen , “On Economic Inequality,” Oxford Univ. Press (Clarendon), Oxford, 1973.
15. K. Suzumura, Rational choice and revealed preference, Rev. Econ. Stud. 43 (1976), 
149-158.
16. K. Suzumura, Houthakker’s axiom in the theory of rational choice, J. Econ. Theory 14 
(1977), 284-290.
Printed by the St. Catherine Press Ltd., Tempelhof 41, Bruges, Belgium
